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THE PLIGHT OF THE AMERICAN MUSICIAN: A
STUDY OF COMPARATIVE COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PROPOSED PERFORMERS'
PROTECTION ACT
By Gary A. Greenberg*
INTRODUCTION

"Being a musician has probably never been more difficult than it
is today.'
The difficulty facing musicians is the result of a lack of employment
opportunities available, at reasonable rates, for musicians performing
music in the United States today.2 Ironically, sound recordings are the
primary culprits.3 This extraordinary sociological problem has been recognized and effectively controlled in Great Britain for some time. However, the United States continues to sing a sour song of short term profits
and long term neglect for this problem.
This article does not address the question of whether the United
* B.A., Brown University, 1979; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1985; attorney with Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Underberg, Manley, Myerson and
Casey, Beverly Hills, California. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of John A.
Fleming, Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Fong-Torres, Sell Out or Ship Out, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 13, 1985 (Datebook
Section), at 19, col. 2 (statement of Bobby Corona, manager and club owner of The Stone in
San Francisco, California).
2. The following statistics are an alarming indication of the seriousness of the problem.
More than one-third of the members of the American Federation of Musicians ("A.F. of M.")
were unemployed in 1976 or had incidences of unemployment. See Copyright Office Hearings
on Performance Rights, reported in Subcom. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d sess., Performance Rights in
Sound Recordings 15 (Comm. Print 1978) ("HEARINGS") (statement of Sanford Wolff, national secretary for the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, based on a study
by the Department of Labor). One-third of the musicians in the A.F. of M. earned less than
$7,000 in 1976 and over half earned less than $13,000. Id. (statement of T. Miles, owner and
publisher of The Hollywood Reporter). The average amount earned by a recording session
musician paid union scale in 1976 was $1,707. Id. (statement of Victor Fuenteabella, president
of the A.F. of M.). It may fairly be assumed that these statistics show even lower rates of pay
for the large number of non-union performing musicians or union members who perform for
less than scale. See S. SCHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 51 (2d ed.
1977).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 112-18.
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States Copyright Act 4 should be amended to provide for performance
rights in sound recordings.' Instead, it focuses on a truly unique approach to the problem of protection for performers currently in place in
Britain.
This article examines the ways in which Britain safeguards the interests of its musicians and the socio-economic justifications and benefits
which underlie its policies. Ultimately, the article will argue for the implementation of similar policies in the United States and will discuss
methods of accomplishing this goal.
AMERICAN PROTECTION OF MUSICAL WORKS AND
SOUND RECORDINGS

United States copyright law derives from the Constitution, which
authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors in their writings
in order to promote the useful arts.6 The bundle of exclusive rights given
to copyright owners by the 1976 Copyright Act includes the right to
reproduce, publicly display or perform, publicly distribute and prepare
derivations of a copyrighted work.' These rights, however, are not always unlimited in scope and may be subject to exemptions and limitations depending, among other things, upon the nature of the copyrighted
work and the use to which it is put.'
With regard to non-dramatic musical works and sound recordings,
the 1976 Copyright Act imposes specific limitations upon the scope of
exclusive rights given. For example, once a non-dramatic musical work
is recorded and distributed to the public with the copyright owner's permission, others are free to record the work and to distribute phonorecords embodying the work to the public, subject only to their paying
a royalty to the copyright owner on every record made and distributed.9
The royalty rate can either be negotiated voluntarily or imposed statutorily. This is commonly referred to as a "compulsory mechanical license," and is designed to insure the public's access to music.'°
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1982)
5. For a full discussion of this topic, see Hayes, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings:
How Far to the Horizon?, 27 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. (ASCAP) 113 (1982). See also Urwin,
Paying the Piper:PerformanceRights in Musical Recordings, 5 CoM. & LAW 3, (Winter 1983).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
8. The most notable general limitations are the "not-for-profit" exclusions found in 17
U.S.C. §§ 108, 110 and 112, and the doctrine of "fair use" as described in 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982).
10. The compulsory license includes the privilege of making an arrangement of the work
to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performer
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There is no compulsory license for sound recordings and unauthorized duplication of a copyrighted recording is prohibited." However,
others are permitted to produce a new recording of the music on a sound
recording so long as it is independently produced.12
As with non-dramatic musical works, the 1976 Copyright Act also
limits the exclusive rights granted to the owner of a copyright in a sound
recording. Prior to 1972, phonorecords were not accorded copyright
protection at all. This forced producers to seek protection for their
sound recordings under common law doctrines of property and unfair
competition and, in an increasing number of states, under specific criminal anti-piracy statutes.
New York pioneered these protections in the 1950's by applying a
misappropriation theory of protection for sound recordings. The leading
case was Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp.,t' in which a preliminary injunction was granted to prevent
the unauthorized offering to the public of recordings of opera performances recorded off the air. Following the Metropolitan Opera case, the
Second Circuit concluded that New York law recognized an exclusive
right in a record producer to make and sell its records and prohibited
unauthorized duplication even of public domain compositions."' The
1976 Copyright Act permits common law protection only for recordings
fixed before February 1972.'"
The misappropriation theory of protection opened the way for states
to enact specific anti-piracy statutes for phonorecords. Perhaps the most
notable is California Penal Code Section 653(h), which makes it a misdemeanor to make an unauthorized duplication of a sound recording with
intent to sell it. 16 The statute was declared constitutional by the United

States Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California'7 and almost all states
provided that the arrangement does not alter the basic melody or fundamental character of the
work. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1982). In addition, the arrangement does not entitle the licensee
to protection of the work as a derivative work without the copyright owner's permission. Id.
II. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1982).
13. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950), preliminary injunction afld per
curiam 297 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
14. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 662 (2d. Cir. 1955).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1982). For discussion of the continued vitality of such protection
in New York, see Mowrey, The Rise and Fall of Record Piracy, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 155, 193-94 (1982). See also Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp.,
740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing an intangible property interest in performances on
tape).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West Supp. 1986).
17. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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now have similar statutes.' 8 These statutes, however, apply only to recordings fixed before February 1972.19 Recordings made after that date
are governed exclusively by the 1976 Copyright Act. 20 February 15,
1972, is the official date on which Congress amended Title 17's provisions to create a new limited copyright in sound recordings fixed, published and copyrighted on or after that date.2 '
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright in a
sound recording has the exclusive right to make phonorecords embodying the recording and to distribute them to the public. 2 However, since
the musical compositions embodied in the sound recording are separate
works of copyright, the producer must pay songwriter royalties for the
mechanical use of the songs, unless the producer also owns those rights.2 3
In addition, since the 1976 Copyright Act specifically excludes any right
of performance in phonorecords, the owner of the copyrighted sound recording is not entitled to prohibit the playing of phonorecords embodying the recording in public, nor is he entitled to a royalty in that
respect.24 For example, the commercial use of phonorecords by radio
broadcasters and discotheque operators creates no direct income for the
record company, which generally derives income solely from retail sales.
The 1976 Copyright Act confers no rights on recording artists for
their performances. Recording artists who are not also songwriters must
rely on contractual payments, in the form of record company allowances,
as the sole return on their artistic efforts. 25 Artists may also negotiate for
a percentage of the record company's retail sales. 26 However, this percentage tends to be small and usually is not payable until the record company has recouped all of its fees and costs associated with the production
and distribution of the record. 27 In addition, restrictive contractual provisions like cross-collateralization of costs between records and reduced
artist royalties on certain sales further reduce the actual percentage. The
result is that most recording artists never see royalty checks from the
18. See

BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 565 (3d. ed. 1978).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1982).
20. Id.
21. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(85 Stat. 391) 417 (1971), superseded by 17 U.S.C. § 114 and § 301(c) (1982).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982).
24. Id.
25. See I.G. ERICKSON. E. HEARN & M. HALLORAN, MUSICIAN'S GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT
58 (rev. ed. 1983).
26. Id. at 58.
27. Id. at 59-60.
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commercial exploitation of their recorded performances.2" This situation
occurs despite the healthy profits generated each year by record use.29
The harshness of this result has been pointed out by several commentators, perhaps never more eloquently than by Barbara Ringer, the Register of Coyrights:
I think it is unfair that individual performers have rarely received any of the benefits from the great technological developments that have, to a large extent, wiped out their profession.
Fairness indicates that it is wrong that they not get paid for
performances of their works.3 °
Numerous attempts have been made in Congress to remedy the
problem of inadequate compensation for performers through proposals
to introduce performance rights in sound recordings into United States
copyright law. To date, the broadcast industry has been successful in
opposing these attempts. As one commentator recently put it, "performance rights remain a pipe dream unable to break out of a fifty year
deadlock."'"
There have, however, been two major efforts to advance performance rights in the last twenty years. The first occurred between 1967 and
1974 as part of the process associated with the general revision of the
1909 Copyright Act.3 2 It involved a proposal, or more accurately, a series of proposals to include performance rights in records in the 1976
Copyright Act subject to compulsory licensing with royalties to be divided equally between record companies and recording artists.3 3 The
proposal was ultimately knocked out of the final version of the bill passed
by Congress in 1974.34
As a compromise to proponents of the bill, section 114(d) was added
to the 1976 Copyright Act calling for the Register of Copyrights to re35
search the question and to report to Congress with recommendations.
Barbara Ringer, the Register of Copyrights, submitted the Register's report in 1978 and strongly recommended adoption of the right.3 6 She pro28. Id.
29. For example, it is estimated that sound recordings accounted for $1.9 billion in radio
advertising revenue in 1977. HEARINGS, supra note 2 (statement of T. Mills).
30. Ringer, Copyright in the 1980s, 23 BULL. COPYR. Soc. 299, 305 (1976).
31. Urwin, supra note 5, at 49.
32. The proposal was fashioned by Senator Williams in 1967 and first appeared before
Congress as S. 543, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 1382 (1969). For a full discussion of
the legislative history of this effort, see generally, Hayes, supra note 5.
33. See BROWN, supra note 19, at 567-68.
34. See Ringer, supra note 30, at 305.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (1982).
36. See HEARINGS, supra note 2 (full text of Register's report to Congress).
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posed amending section 114 to provide for performance rights subject to
compulsory licensing with royalties to be split equally among performers,
including employees for hire, and producers as joint authors.3 7 Of particular interest was her finding that payment of performance royalties
would not disrupt the broadcasting industry, adversely affect programming, nor drive marginally profitable stations out of business.38
This led to the second major effort in Congress. This occurred between 1977 and 1982. It centered around a bill introduced in the House
of Representatives. 39 Like its predecessor, H.R. 997 proposed amending
the 1976 Act to provide for performance rights in sound recordings. The
proposal called for flat fees to be paid by radio and television stations
based on a percentage of their gross advertising revenue, a fee of one
dollar for jukebox operators, a fee of one hundred dollars for dance establishments, and a flat fee of twenty-five dollars for all other users except television stations with receipts under one million dollars and public
broadcast stations.' The method of distribution was to be determined
by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal with half of the royalties going to the
copyright owner and half to be shared among the recording artists.4"
Hopes ran high among proponents of the bill, but repeated delays in
Congress have turned these expectations into pessimism about the future
of the proposal.4"
THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF PROTECTION

By contrast, statutory protection for phonorecords has existed in
Great Britain since 191L. 43 Curiously, the right was not exercised until
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The bill was first introduced as H.R. 6063, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REC.
10,463 (1977). See 24 BULL. COPYR. Soc. 428 (1977). It was suspended pending the report of
the Register of Copyright. It was reintroduced as H.R. 997, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. 461 (1979). See 27 BULL. COPYR. Soc. 223 (1980). An identical bill was introduced in
the Senate at that time as S. 1552, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 20,032-35 (1979). 27
BULL. COPRY. Soc. at 229 (both bills will hereinafter be referred to as H.R. 997).
40. Id. at 241.
41. Id. For criticism of H.R. 997, see infra text accompanying notes 124-125.
42. See Billboard, Nov. 14, 1982, at 46; also reported in 29 BULL. COPYR. Soc. 452
(1982). For a full discussion of the legislative history of H.R. 997, see generally Urwin, supra
note 5.
43. The 1911 Act provided that "copyright shall subsist in records, perforated rolls and
other contrivances by means of which sounds may be mechanically reproduced, in like manner
... Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46,
as if such contrivances were musical works.
§ 19, sched. 1; superseded by Copyright Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, ch. 74 § 12, sched. I1 ("The
1956 Copyright Act").
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1934. In Gramophone Co. v. Stephen Carwardine Ltd.,44 the Gramophone Company of England sued the proprietors of a restaurant for the
unauthorized performance in public of a sound recording manufactured
by them. The Carwardine case established that the owner of the copyright in a phonorecord is the owner of the sole right to use that record for
a performance in public and that the record makers were entitled to a
royalty in that respect by virtue of the 1911 Act.4 5
The decision has never been appealed or reversed.4 6 In fact, the
holding was adopted and broadened by Parliament in the 1956 Copyright
Act. Under this statute, the acts restricted by copyright in a sound recording include making a record embodying the recording, causing the
recording to be heard in public, and broadcasting the recording.4 Under
the 1956 Act, the "maker" of a phonorecord is entitled to copyright.4 8
"Maker" is defined as the person who owns the first record embodying
the recording.49 Therefore, since 1934, the British record industry has
exercised its right to license the broadcasting and public performance of
its records.5"
PERFORMING RIGHT SOCIETIES

Fueled by the Carwardine decision, record companies set up a performing right society in 1934 called Phonographic Performance Ltd.
("PPL") to administer the new right.51 The existence of a performance
right in favor of record manufacturers was unique to Britain at the
time.5 2 In an effort to lobby other governments to introduce performing
rights in records into their laws, the record manufacturers set up an international pressure group called the International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry. 53 The Federation met with some success, but
faced staunch opposition, most notably from the United States, which
continues to exclude performing rights in records from its laws.
Thus, users of phonorecords for public performance in the United
44. [1934] Ch. 450.
45. Id. See also G.

MCFARLANE, COPYRIGHT: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF

THE PERFORMING RIGHT 132, 136 (1980).

46. Id.
47. 1956 Copyright Act § 12(5).
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 12(8).
50. See PERFORMING RIGHT SOCIETY, PERFORMING RIGHT YEARBOOK: 1984-1985 56
(1984).
51. See MCFARLANE, supra note 45, at 13.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 136. Fifty-one nations currently recognize the performance right to some extent.
See HEARINGS, supra note 2.
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States today are required to be licensed only by the performing right organizations that license music on behalf of composers and publishers.
The two primary organizations are the American Society of Composers
and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI"). As the
names indicate, ASCAP is an unincorporated association whose members are composers and publishers, while BMI is a non-profit corporation
owned and operated by the radio broadcast industry.5 4 A third less
prominent organization represents European stage authors and
composers. 5
Despite these structural differences, all three organizations perform
essentially the same function. They act as clearinghouses for owners of
music copyrights by issuing bulk licenses to users on an annual basis.56
These blanket licenses entitle the licensee to unlimited access to all of the
music in the societies' repertoire. 57 The licenses do not distinguish between types of use, that is, performances by live musicians and performances by mechanical reproduction. 58 Radio and television broadcasters
typically pay a fee based on a percentage of their annual receipts from the
sale of air time, whereas club owners typically are assessed a flat fee depending upon the size and nature of the establishment.5 9
By contrast, a public user of phonorecords in Britain must be licensed both by the Performing Rights Society ("PRS"), which represents
composers and publishers, and by PPL, which represents record producers.6" In administering the performance right on behalf of producers in
Britain, PPL has demonstrated considerable social responsibility.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM

As previously discussed, Phonographic Performance Ltd. was set up
in 1934 by the British recording industry to control the broadcasting and
public use of their recordings and to issue licenses for those purposes. 6 '
54. For a description of the structure of these organizations, see Buffalo Broadcasting v.
American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
55. See BROWN, supra note 18, at 406.
56. See, e.g., Buffalo Broadcasting,546 F. Supp. at 277.
57. Id. See also ASCAP. Going Like 61, ASCAP Today, Spring 1975, at 19.
58. See BROWN, supra note 18, at 407.
59. Id.
60. British licensees have complained about having to pay twice for essentially the same
right. However, this argument has been rejected on the grounds that "the licenses are for
entirely different purposes." J. WHITFORD, COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS LAW: REPORT OF THE
WHITFORD COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 101 (1978).
61. PHONOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE LTD., GENERAL HISTORICAL INFORMATION,
BROADCASTING AND PUBLIC USE OF SOUND RECORDINGS.
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Instead of exploiting the right purely for profit, PPL's member producers62 have administered the right in large part for the benefit of recording artists and live musicians. For example, like most performing right
organizations, PPL is a non-profit organization that is operated for the
benefit of its members.6 3 However, the revenue collected from license
royalties is not distributed exclusively among the record companies; instead, ex gratia payments, amounting to almost half of PPL's net distributable income, are made to recording artists, musicians and copyright
64
owners.
PPL also enforces a policy, through licensing, which is designed to
protect the livelihood of recording artists and performing musicians.6 5
PPL's policy with regard to musicians was formulated in the early 1950's
when record use started to expand together with broadcasting.6 6
PPL maintained that the unrestricted commercial exploitation of
phonorecords threatened to seriously reduce and in some cases entirely
eliminate employment opportunities available to live musicians. 67 To
avert this threat, PPL enacted a policy of limiting the licenses it granted
to radio broadcasters and commercial establishments that use phonorecords as specially featured musical entertainment.6 8
With regard to the latter type of user, PPL enforces a truly unique
policy of requiring them to put on a reasonable ratio of live music, wherever possible, as part of their license. 69 In other words, before a commercial establishment, such as a discotheque or dance hall, can obtain a
license to play phonorecords in PPL's repertoire, it must agree to employ
live musicians according to a schedule determined under the license.7 °
Of course, not every commercial user of recorded music is required
to be licensed by either PPL or the PRS. This is because British copyright law, like United States copyright law, exempts certain private or
quasi-domestic performances from what would otherwise be an infring62. In 1980, there were approximately 135 member companies. See LADDIE, PRESCOTT &

471 (1980).
63. Phonographic Performance Ltd., supra note 61, The Licensing Body.
64. When PPL was established, the basis of distribution was twenty percent of the net
distributable income for the benefit of recording artists, twelve percent for the musician's union
and a further ten percent for the music publishers. MCFARLANE, supra note 45, at 132, 133.
65. Letter of Anthony Brand, PPL licensing agent (Feb. 12, 1985).
VICTORIA, THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT

66. Id.
67. PHONOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 61, Records and Musicians: The Sociological Problem Explained.
68. Brand, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. The schedule appears on the face of the license and describes the specific days and
hours when phonorecords may be played as specially featured musical entertainment.
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ing act; namely, causing sound recordings to be heard in public.7" It
should be noted, however, that British courts have demonstrated a reluctance to apply the exemption in cases where it would unreasonably deprive the copyright owner of compensation.7 2 Therefore, the term "in
public" is generally given a broad definition by British courts.7 3 It
should also be noted that performance of a sound recording which occurs
through the reception of a broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corp.
("BBC") or the Independent Broadcasting Authority is not an infringement of the copyright in the sound recording.7 4 This does not apply to
the underlying music on the record which, as in the United States, is
protected in these circumstances and must be licensed by the PRS.7"
In addition to the statutory exemption available for private or quasidomestic performances, PPL itself exempts certain establishments from
the requirement to employ live musicians, especially where the music
they provide is background music only.76 In this regard, the licensee
must reach an agreement with the musicians' union which has the primary responsibility for determining the terms of a given license.77 The
musicians' union in Britain is fairly active in the record industry since
most recording artists are members in what tends to be a "closed shop"
set-up.7" According to PPL, there are no set guidelines and each case is
taken on its merits.7 9 Basically, the exemption appears to be available
where the establishment is not using phonorecords to displace live musicians, but rather is unable to employ them due to factors such as the size,
nature and location of the establishment.8s
71. 1956 Copyright Act, § 12(7)(a). See, e.g., Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Pontin's
Ltd. [1968] Ch. 290.
72. See, e.g., Performing Rights Soc'y v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. [1979] 1 W.L.R.
851, also reported in [1979] 2 All E.R. 828.
73. Id. See also Performing Rights Soc'y v. Rangers Supporters Club [1975] R.P.C. 626;
South African Music Rights Org. v. Trust Butchers Ltd. [1978] 1 S.A. 1052.
74. 1956 Copyright Act § 40(1).
75. See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 97. Thus, the playing of a radio in public for the
entertainment of patrons when a record program is being broadcast is not an infringement of
the copyright in the records. The radio station, as the originator of the programming, must
still be licensed by PPL, but not the establishment owner.
76. Id. at 102.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Letter of Anthony Brand, PPL licensing agent (Mar. 30, 1985). A "closed shop" setup is one in which the employer agrees to hire only union members and to discharge any
employee who fails to maintain union membership. See H. LADDIE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LABOR LAW 70 (2d. ed. 1979). This would indicate that the musicians' union in Britain
exercises significant control over the music work force there. This is not the case in the United
States. See SCHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 2, at 51.
79. Brand, supra note 78.
80. Id.
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The same considerations are taken into account in determining what
constitutes a reasonable ratio of live music for a licensee who is determined to be capable of complying with the requirement. 8' As an example, a discotheque operating in an urban area typically would be required
to employ musicians three nights per week where the club has applied for
record use on six or seven nights per week.82 In deciding what is reasonable, PPL refers to information provided by the applicant regarding,
among other things, the club's frequency of operation, average attendance, and admission prices.8 3
Licensees who feel that the terms of a license are unreasonable, or
that the refusal to issue a license except on certain terms is unfair, may
84
petition the Performing Right Tribunal ("PRT") for a determination.
The PRT was set up as part of the 1956 Act.8" It has jurisdiction to hear
disputes between licensing bodies and persons requiring licenses.8 6 The
process is relatively informal and inexpensive.87
The PRT sits on a part time basis and less than a score of judgments
have been rendered since its inception. 88 This attests both to the effectiveness of the PRT as an administrative body and to the fairness of
PPL's policies, which are fashioned so as to avoid PRT involvement.8 9
According to the Whitford Commission, a governmental body formed in
1978 to consider the law of copyright in Great Britain, PPL's policies
with regard to musicians have been administered with common sense and
an aim not to take too hard a line against licensees.9"
With regard to radio licensees, PPL accomplishes its policy of protecting the interests of live musicians and recording artists by limiting the
amount of "needle time" allowed in the license. 9 Needle time is the
amount of air time which a radio station devotes to the playing of phonorecords. PPL's right to control needle time derives from the statutory
81. See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 102.
82. Brand, supra note 78.
83. Id.
84. 1956 Copyright Act § 27(3). Thus, complaints by PPL licensees regarding the imposition of conditions, such as the requirement to employ live musicians, are settled by the PRT.
See, e.g., Reditune v. Performing Rights Soc'y [1981] F.S.R. 165, reported in [1981] C.L.Y.
324.
85. 1956 Copyright Act § 23(1).
86. 1956 Copyright Act § 24(1). This also applies to radio broadcasters.
87. The initial fee for filing a petition is only six British pounds, half of which is refundable
if there is no hearing. Although a party may be represented by counsel, this is not required.
See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 102.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See McFARLANE, supra note 45, at 136. The PRT's decisions are not published.
Brand, supra note 78.
See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 102.
Brand, supra note 65.
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right of the copyright owner of a sound recording to authorize the broadcasting of the recording. 92
PPL's dealings with the BBC date back to the 1930's. These dealings began as a two-pronged matter governed by the use of gramophone
records on the air and the relationship between PPL and the musicians'
union.93 The union's concern over record use on the air arose from the
fact that, at the time, a large number of orchestras depended upon the
BBC for their existence.9 4 The union saw recorded music as a threat to
these musicians and instituted the policy of limiting needle time to avert
the threat. Today, the BBC employs hundreds of musicians. It still runs
five in-house orchestras and employs outside orchestras like the London
Symphony to do special programs. 95
PPL's control of needle time was first challenged in the celebrated
Manx Radio9 6 case decided by the PRT in 1964. In that case, PPL had
offered to issue a license to the Manx radio station on condition that not
more than one-fifth of its broadcasting be devoted to the playing of phonorecords in PPL's repertoire. 97 Manx objected and petitioned the PRT
for greater needle time on the ground that PPL's terms were unreasonable.98 The PRT ruled that Manx's needle time be increased to half of its
total broadcast time.99
However, the decision also contained concessions to PPL. Specifically, it called for increased royalty payments during the second to fourth
years of the license." The PRT also observed that when the license was
to be renewed, it would be a matter of interest to the PRT to inquire into
"the amount of help" which Manx had given to live musicians, either by
92. 1956 Copyright Act § 12.
93. See Counting Up Copyright Costs, Musicians Weekly, Mar. 1985, at 6, col. 1 (statement
of Anthony Jennings, BBC legal adviser).
94. Brand, supra note 78.
95. See HEARINGS, supra note 2 (statement of E. Fleishman, Los Angeles Philharmonic).
In 1984, the BBC spent more than six million British pounds on salaries for its in-house
orchestras. See Musicians Weekly supra note 93.
96. Performing Right Tribunal dec. 17/64 (Mar. 1965), reportedin STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 149 (1983).
97. WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 103.
98. Id. The BBC and the musicians' union intervened, as they are permitted under Performing Right Tribunal rules. STAT. INST. 1965, No. 1506. The BBC contended that Manx
should not enjoy greater needle time than was allowed the BBC, while the union intervened on
the ground that any extension of needle time would damage the interests of live musicians.
For the full text of the PRT rules of 1965, see COPINGER & SKONE JAMES, COPYRIGHT 825-46
(12th ed. 1980).
99. WHITFORD,

supra note 60, at 103.

100. The beginning royalty was fixed at eight percent of the station's net yearly revenue
from advertising. STEWART, supra note 96, at 149.
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direct employment or by the promotion of their interests on the island. '0 '
When, in 1980, the PRT again considered licenses to broadcast phonorecords, this time for an association of nineteen independent commercial radio stations, it largely reaffirmed its findings in the Manx
decision.'o 2
It should be noted, however, that opposition to PPL's control of
needle time appears to be growing and the association has submitted certain points to the High Court in Britain for final determination. 10 3 The
broadcasters argue that the high cost of operating a successful radio station is made higher by PPL's policy, which undercuts the station's ability
to attract audiences and generate revenue.
By virtue of PPL's licensing policy, commercial radio in Great Britain today devotes not more than half its air time to the playing of phonorecords. In the United States, where no such restrictions exist, the
typical commercial station devotes approximately seventy-five percent of
°5

its programming to the playing of recorded

Music.

THE NEED FOR PROTECTION

PPL and the musicians' union defend their licensing policies as necessary to protect the livelihood and, ultimately, the existence of the live
musical professional.10 6 They point out that sound recordings offer an
extremely cheap and convenient method for the consistent presentation
of performances by the most proficient musicians; performances that can
be reproduced with incomparable sound quality. 0 7 They argue that
without the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the introduction of
sound recordings for public entertainment, employment opportunities
available to musicians, especially those at the grass roots level, would be
seriously reduced and in some cases entirely eliminated. 0 8 In support of
their argument, the musicians' union points out that in the absence of
such control:
. . . musical employment has virtually disappeared from radio
101. Id.
102. Association of Ind. Local Radio Contractors v. Phonographic Performance Ltd. and
Musician's Union. Performing Right Tribunal dec. (1980), reported in STEWART, supra note
96, at 149.
103. Brand, supra note 78.
104. See Musicians Weekly, supra note 93.
105. See HEARINGS, supra note 2 (statement of Jack Golodner, director of department for
professional employees of the AFL-CIO).
106. See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 103.
107. See PHONOGRAPHIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 67.
108. Id.
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in the U.S., and that musicians in other countries are expressing
grave doubts about the future of their profession as a result of
the erosion of employment opportunities by recorded music. 0 9
PPL's arguments are most convincing in justifying its policy of requiring club owners to employ a reasonable ratio of live musicians whenever possible. Just as PPL has admonished, employment opportunities
for live musicians in the United States today are extremely limited and
competition for a "gig" is fierce. According to the manager of one prominent San Francisco club, "Bands are begging us for gigs from the day
they start being a band. There are 500 bands that want to be on every
show I book. At least fifty will call me once a week.""'
This lack of
opportunity forces bands to perform for free and even to pay club owners
for the chance to perform."' Surprisingly, club owners complain that
even under these circumstances, it is often unprofitable to produce live
shows.' 2 This is due to the fact that a live show requires the employment
of various support personnel such as equipment, stage, light and sound
managers, whereas a record format requires only a disc jockey. In addition, there are extra maintenance expenses and risks. Perhaps most significantly, the quality of live performances is inconsistent and audience
response is difficult to predict.
It is perhaps more difficult to understand how PPL justifies its policy with respect to radio licensees. While it is true that elimination of
control would be likely to reduce the amount of direct employment for
musicians performing live on the air, the publicity and exposure that
greater needle time would afford to recording artists would, arguably,
offset this loss. However, any increase in needle time is likely to be eaten
up by the playing of music by successful artists, while the emerging artist
most in need of exposure would continue to be ignored." 3
To meet the growing opposition to PPL's control of needle time and
still accomplish the purposes behind the policy, PPL could replace the
policy with affirmative requirements, like those imposed upon discotheque licensees, to preserve a reasonable ratio of air time for live per109. See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 102.
110. Fong-Torres, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1. (statement of Queenie Taylor, manager of
Wolfgang's nightclub in San Francisco, California).
111. Id. at 17, col. 1 (statement of an unidentified San Francisco club manager).
112. Id. at 19, col. 2 (statement of Bobby Corona).
113. See Hayes, supra note 5 at 136-37. Based on statements by the American recording
industry in 1975, Hayes points out that a "top forty" radio station usually adds only five or six
new songs to its program play list each week, whereas about 900 new songs are released weekly
by the recording industry.
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formances and to devote a reasonable amount of their increased needle
time to records by "emerging artists."
Regardless of the form in which they are cast, PPL's policies with
regard to musicians are supported by powerful ethical, social and economic considerations which argue for their implementation in the United
States. Requiring American radio and discotheque operators to contribute to the support of the profession on which their output depends is not
unreasonable. America has a stake in the continued existence and vitality
of the live musical professional. Policies like those administered by PPL
in Great Britain would increase employment opportunities for musicians
in the United States, thereby attracting more people into the profession
in addition to discouraging others from quitting. Perhaps most compelling, the policies offer potential economic benefits for the American record industry.
Critics of these policies could argue that any attempt at such regulation in the United States would constitute an impermissible intrusion
upon our system of free enterprise and would violate the first amendment. They could argue that the right of a broadcaster or club owner to
choose its programming is protected speech and that policies like those
administered by PPL would unconstitutionally interfere with that
speech." 4 In response, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting"5 and evolving case law recognizing a common law "right of publicity," ' 6 support the notion that first
amendment rights may be properly limited where it is necessary to protect a person's pecuniary interest in his or her performances. This body
of law validates the balancing of interests in favor of extending protection
to performers over first amendment challenges. 17
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: THE PERFORMERS' PROTECTION ACT

This leads to the final and perhaps most difficult question: how can
these policies be implemented in the United States? One method would
be to grant a performance right in sound recordings, through copyright,
for the benefit of producers and recording artists.
This would be a generally favorable idea. However, past attempts to
114. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948): Writers
Guild of Am. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1140 (C.D. Cal.
1976); American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
115. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
116. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975): Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 608 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
117. See Urwin, supra note 5, at 32-34.
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establish performance rights do not lead proponents to be sanguine about
the prospects of approval from Congress. In addition, legislation proposed toward this end has not proven to be free of defects. For example,
the latest bill, H.R. 997, has been criticized for chiefly aiding performers
of popular music while promising little or no help for those performing
less popular music-those who are most in need of assistance.1 8 Another criticism is the bill's failure to distinguish between those types of
performance which are "artistic" and thereby entitled to copyright and
those which are merely "reproductive" and thus do not qualify as "original works of authorship." ' 9
Despite the defects in reform bills proposed to date, the idea of performance rights in records remains a good one. One of the advantages of
recognizing the right is that it would enable the United States to ratify
the Rome Convention, an international convention established in 1961 to
protect performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.12 o This would entitle United States recording artists and producers to collect foreign royalties from the performance of their sound
recordings in countries which recognize the right.' 2 '
In the meantime, legislation designed to accomplish the purposes
underlying PPL's policies with regard to musicians in Great Britain
could be introduced in the United States. The legislation would authorize the imposition of conditions upon non-exempt commercial users of
phonorecords for the protection of performing musicians and recording
artists. Such a Performers' Protection Act ("PPA") would embody
PPL's policy of requiring club owners and other similar public utilizers
of music to put on a reasonable ratio of live music whenever possible.
Exemptions for certain private and non-commercial users could be fashioned along lines similar to the statutory exemptions to copyright infringement of a musical work contained in section 110 of the 1976
Copyright Act.122 In addition, guidelines modeled after PPL's common
sense administration of its requirements would allow still other users
who are unable to comply to avoid the requirements.' 2 3
118. Id. at 57.
119. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
120. See COPINGER & SKONE JAMES, supra note 98, at 370. The international accord for
the protection of literary and artistic works found in the Paris Act also makes clear that the
public performance of a work by gramophone records is protected by The Berne Convention
under Article 13(1). Id. at 578-79.
121. It was estimated in 1978 that these potential foreign royalties were approximately $13
million. See HEARINGS, supra note 2 (statement of L. Weiner, special assistant for cultural
resources to the Secretary of Commerce).
122. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 76-90.
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With regard to radio broadcasters, the PPA would require stations
to devote a reasonable ratio of needle time to the playing of phonorecords
by "emerging artists." Artists could be certified for this purpose by the
administrative bodies to be discussed below.' 2 4 In addition, radio stations might be required to devote a reasonable ratio of air time to live
broadcasts and interviews with musicians. Exceptions would be available
for non-profit organizations and for stations programming non-musical
material. These exceptions could be modeled on the 1976 Copyright
Act's exemptions to copyright infringement of a musical work used in
connection with non-commercial broadcasting. 2 '
The PPA could be administered by United States performing right
organizations in conjunction with the American Federation of Musicians
("A.F. of M."). These organizations already license the performance of
copyrighted music in public.' 2 6 They police unlicensed performances
and assist their members in enforcing copyright violations.' 2 7 Difficult
determinations and classifications, such as what constitutes a reasonable
ratio of live music for a given user and who are "emerging artists," could
be made by the A.F. of M. To oversee the administration of the PPA,
the jurisdiction of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal could be extended to
include powers like those exercised by the PRT in Britain.'2 8
Similar to the concept of performance rights in sound recordings,
the PPA speaks to the problem of inadequate protection for performers
under existing law. Unlike the concept of performance rights, which relies upon the direct subsidization of performers through the payment of
royalties, the PPA is predicated upon a system of self-help for performers
to be accomplished by increasing opportunities for employment and exposure which would be available to them. Perhaps this difference could
be used to convince the National Association of Broadcasters not to oppose the PPA as vehemently as it has fought against performance rights
in records.
The strongest objections to the PPA are likely to come from club
owners who would probably prefer to pay a flat annual fee in exchange
for unrestricted record use. They would argue that the PPA's requirement to employ live musicians would increase their overhead costs to a
124. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1982).
126. See BROWN, supra note 18, at 407.
127. See, e.g., Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d. Cir. 1981).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90. For a detailed discussion of the advantages
of an agency like the PRT over existing judicial enforcement in the United States, see Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 103 (1984).

LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

point where many would be forced out of business, thereby reducing employment opportunities for musicians in the long run. In response to
these objections, there is no evidence to indicate that the imposition of
PPL's policies in Great Britain in the 1950's has led to a decline in the
number of clubs operating since then. 129 In fact, because PPL recognized the symbiotic relationship between club owner and performing musician, it administers its requirements according to a club's ability to
comply. 30
To overcome opposition, political success for the PPA would depend upon the ability of the American music industry to unify in a concerted lobbying effort. In this regard, the major record companies are
the crucial actors; but they are likely to question the value to them of
support for the PPA. Requiring broadcasters to reserve some needle
time for the playing of music by emerging artists would benefit smaller,
independent record companies at the expense of the major labels. In
addition, requiring club owners to employ live musicians would cut into
the amount of exposure for major record companies' products. Finally,
these companies would likely assert a vested interest in any legislation
designed to benefit performers and recording artists and would prefer to
continue to pressure Congress for performance rights in records, which
would benefit them more directly. As pointed out above, the chances of
getting this type of legislation passed are slim, and in any event the PPA
would not duplicate or undermine a performance right. Rather, as in
Britain, it would work with the right to provide extra protection for performers and emerging recording artists.
In direct response to the questions raised on behalf of the major
record companies, the PPA would benefit American producers, both big
and small, over the long run. Many record companies actively solicit
new talent. Although this effort is international in scope, companies typically rely on talent available at the local level.' 3 ' When an act is "discovered" by a record company, the act is signed to a standard producer's
contract.132 Because the unproven act has little or no bargaining power,
the producer's contract reflects terms which are unilaterally favorable to
the producer. 3 3 Once a band achieves success, the terms become more
129. See WHITFORD, supra note 60, at 102.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
131. Interview with Patrick Clifford, artist and repertoire agent for Epic Records (Apr. 10.
1985).
132. Interview with Edward Rubin, Professor of Law at Boalt Hall School of Law. University of California, Berkeley, (Mar. 14, 1985).
133. See, e.g., Motown Record Corp. v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d 482, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 227 (1984).
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balanced. 134
Since the 1950's, British music has enjoyed a prominent position in
the world market.' 35 The breakthrough came with the success of The
Beatles, who occupied the first five places in the "American Top 100" in
April 1964.136 The Beatles have been followed by a long list of British
rock stars like The Rolling Stones and David Bowie, who have continued
British prominence into the 1980's. 137
This is not to say that Great Britain has achieved its prominence
solely by virtue of PPL's licensing policies. Other factors such as widespread unemployment and heightened social awareness have been advanced as explanations. 38 However, PPL's policies, especially insofar as
they reflect acceptance in Great Britain of the value of encouraging the
livelihood of musicians, are significant. Ironically, Britain has achieved
this success at America's expense. 39 The United States is, by far, the
largest consumer of music in the world today and the British music industry enthusiastically cashes in on that consumerism." 3 If the American music industry could cash in on its own market in proportions which
more closely reflect this country's enormous consumerism, then American producers would benefit.
By fostering the profession of the performing musician in the United
States, the PPA would facilitate this result by enlarging the pool of potentially successful recording artists available at the local level.
Although American companies are free to sign a British act, that act is
likely to be under contract with a British company and would have to be
bought out on terms less favorable than those which could be imposed
upon a newly discovered act.
Additional possibilities exist with lobbying groups like a songwriterpublic policy alliance, which could be formed to sponsor the PPA. However, without the muscle of the major producers, the chances of success
134. Rubin, supra note 132.
135. See MCFARLANE, supra note 45, at 153.
136. Id.
137. For example, one British group that recently topped the record charts in the United
States is Culture Club, whose first album, "Kissing to be Clever," boasted three top ten hits,
the first such occurrence since the Beatles' debut album. Collins, Boy George, He Wears the
Pants in Culture Club, Rolling Stone, June 7, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
138. Id. See also Weissong, State of the Arts, Music Calendar, Jan. 1985, at 7, col. I (statement of Paul Turpin, professional musician).
139. See BOOKER, THE NEOPHILIACS 38 (1969).
140. For example, the two major U.S. organizations, ASCAP and BMI, are the largest
single source of foreign royalties for members of the PRS. See Performing Right Society, supra
note 50 at 73. In 1983, roughly thirty percent of the total income of PRS came from overseas
royalties. Id. at 8.
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would be limited. Still another alternative would be to impose a tax on
the sale of phonorecords, the proceeds of which could be used to subsidize club owners and radio broadcasters who comply with the policies.
That part of the PPA which affects radio broadcasters alternatively could
be pursued through the Federal Communications Commission. However, given the current climate in favor of deregulation in that agency,
this option is unrealistic.' 4 1
Another alternative would be for ASCAP and BMI to institute the
policies underlying the PPA without statutory authority through their
current licensing. Unfortunately, this action would be vulnerable to attack on first amendment and antitrust grounds.' 4 2 On the antitrust issue,
BMI's and ASCAP's licensing policies have already been the subject of
several major attacks. The Justice Department first investigated the societies in the early 1940's. This resulted in a consent decree, under which
ASCAP and BMI still operate. 4 Twenty years later, the Columbia
Broadcasting System alleged price fixing in an ultimately unsuccessful
suit that lasted almost twelve years." Recently, a successful class action
was brought by television broadcasters in New York charging that the
blanket licensing policies unreasonably restrained trade. 45 Even more
recently, the licensing practices of BMI have come under attack again,
this time by a Maryland tavern owner.146
CONCLUSION

Sadly, none of these proposals is likely to be embraced either by the
American record industry or by Congress; the former because of its preference for short term profits over long term gains, and the latter because
of the current climate in favor of deregulation and predictable opposition
from the powerful National Association of Broadcasters. However, the
program is mandated not only by social and ethical considerations, but
also by strong economic arguments.
141. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 207 (1982).
142. For discussion of the first amendment issue, see supra text accompanying notes 114117.
143. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, (S.D.N.Y.
1941), reported in 1940-1943 TRADE CASES 56, 104.
144. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom.,
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, (1979), affd on remand, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
145. Buffalo Broadcasting,546 F. Supp. at 274.
146. See Sobel, Legal Briefs, Hollywood Reporter, Mar. 5, 1982, at 14, reported in 29
BULL. COPYR. Soc. 702 (1982).
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51

The problem of how to protect the legitimate interests of performers
has plagued American lawmakers for nearly half a century. Fortunately,
a study of comparative copyright law yields a solution. Great Britain has
long recognized the importance of protecting the livelihood of its musicians and has enjoyed the fruits of its wisdom. It is time for the United
States to recognize and take steps to develop one of its greatest national
resources, American music.

